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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

J OURNAL of

LAW REFORM ONLINE
COMMENT

REFORMING THE TAX CODE: A TALE OF TWO PURPOSES
AND PARALYSIS
Gene Magidenko*
Though the presidential election of 2012 is still some time
away, national politics have been in the thick of one for several
months now. One of the top issues being debated is the tax code. 1
Most agree that the tax code should be simplified, but to say that
the proposals to do this are various is an understatement. This
perennial question of reform has been a fixture of the national
debate for a long time, so little of what can be said about it is
particularly novel. All the same, a brief overview of the purposes
behind our system of taxation and how they inform the present
debate about tax reform is useful. The ultimate conclusion,
unsatisfying as it may be, is that there are serious systemic
obstacles to any substantive changes to the tax code.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Until the early twentieth century, states were responsible for
imposing most of the tax burden on Americans. The federal
government primarily relied on tariffs and excise taxes and
resorted only temporarily to income taxation during the Civil
War. 2 During the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century,
federal taxation achieved a new prominence that soon eclipsed
that of the states. Following the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913, income taxation expanded prodigiously.
Presently, the federal government imposes most of the burden on

*
J.D. Candidate, December 2012, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
See, e.g., Nina Easton, It’s Time for an Honest Tax Debate, TERM SHEET (Jan. 25,
2012, 12:25 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/25/obama-tax-debate/.
2.
Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era
Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1793, 1803-04 (2005).
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taxpayers—and specifically on their incomes. 3
The history of federal income taxation suggests that two
primary and occasionally conflicting schools of thought prompted
the imposition of income tax. The first was born of a desire to
raise revenue for the essential functions of government. 4 The
government by its very nature must have some expenditures (the
extent and allocation of expenditures, of course, is a constant
source of contention) to fulfill its core constitutional functions of
providing for the national defense, regulating commerce, coining
money, maintaining a postal system, maintaining federal courts,
controlling federal lands, etc. 5 There are a variety of ways in
which the federal government could theoretically raise the funds
to accomplish these functions. Among the various potential
mechanisms are tariffs, excise taxes, consumption/sales taxes (e.g.,
a value-added tax), wealth taxes, property taxes, and income taxes.
The choice of imposing income taxation may seem odd at first
glance, because it is more difficult to collect and enforce at the
national level than other taxes. But there are two reasons why
income taxation is particularly attractive to a federal government
that is constantly growing in size and scope (and the goal of
which—frequently at odds with that of taxpayers—becomes to
maximize tax revenues), notwithstanding administrative
difficulties. First, such a tax creates a large tax base: a lot of people
earn a lot of money. And second, an income tax allows the
government to tax a single stream of wealth multiple times as it
circulates through the economy. For example, a worker receives a
sum of money, on which he is taxed, and which he spends in a
store on various goods. The shopkeeper then spends the money
(on which he in turn is taxed) on books. The bookstore owner too
is taxed on that income, which he uses to buy a car. And so on.
The second and more recent school of thought behind a

3.
Compare Tax Foundation, Selected Federal Rates, 2012, TAX DATA (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/28015.html, with Tax Foundation, State
Individual Income Tax Rates, 2000–2012, TAX DATA (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.TaxFoundation.org/ taxdata/show/228.html. See also Kail M. Padgitt, Tax
Freedom Day Arrives on April 12, TAX FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 2011, at 6
(Figure 2), available at http://www.TaxFoundation.org/files/sr190.pdf.
4.
See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role
of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2005)
(“Taxes are used to raise revenue to fund government services .…”).
5.
See U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8.
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graduated income tax is wealth redistribution. 6 The conscious
allocation of wealth is a means by which the government can fund
programs that disproportionately benefit only certain
constituencies, an inevitable result in a pluralistic representative
democracy. This is the primary factor differentiating the “wealth
redistribution” purpose from the essential revenue-raising
function of government noted in the previous paragraph. The
latter, as originally envisioned, exists to fund the quintessential
public goods—those from which all in society benefit relatively
equally—and relies only on raising sufficient funds to cover those
core functions. Wealth redistribution funds group-specific
programs from which only some in society benefit. 7 The
unlimited demand of various constituencies invariably means that
the government seeks expansion of the supply of government
services, whether core or otherwise. Additionally, the Progressive
Era variant of this idea suggests that large accumulations of
wealth in the hands of any given individual are undesirable. 8
There is a persistent preoccupation with wealth disparities. In an
economy that is not planned top-down, the way to level incomes is
to more-than-proportionally reduce the earnings of the more
affluent by taxing their income directly. Whether this raises more
revenue is not necessarily considered a relevant question. 9
THE MODERN DEBATE
Viewing the modern debate over tax reform through the lens
of these two competing ideas is particularly informative. It is
6.
See Bird & Zolt, supra note 4, at 1630, 1670 (“Countries also use taxes (and
expenditures) to change the distribution of income or wealth.”).
7.
Some may counter that a redistribution program, like a safety net for example,
disincentivizes over-saving and frees up assets to go to productive use. However, it is
debatable whether disincentivizing over-saving is a public good. Indeed, higher savings
rates can actually lead to greater and cheaper loan availability (assuming people save
money in banks). This allows entrepreneurs to start more businesses and create additional
wealth.
8.
The idea is that there is supposedly greater social stability that comes with greater
wealth redistribution. This is almost certainly not a public good. The putative recipients of
redistributed wealth are either no worse off than they were before (if they get nothing) or
are better off (if they receive money or benefits). On the other hand, those from whom
money is taken for distribution are worse off in both scenarios (they either have to pay or
face riots). In that sense, the argument for wealth redistribution as a means of alleviating
social tensions is essentially extortive.
9.
See, e.g., David Callahan, Occupy the Tax Code, THE GREAT DEBATE (Dec. 13,
2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2011/12/13/occupy-the-tax-code/ (arguing that
increasing taxes on the wealthy is necessary to reduce income inequality).
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rarely a question of entirely eliminating one of the two purposes.
Any system of taxation inherently raises some revenue and
allocates wealth. The question is whether the redistribution of
wealth is a conscious goal of the system, and if so, to what end.
Our current system explicitly adopts the wealth-redistribution
purpose. 10 This purpose was particularly salient from the 1930s
through the end of the 1970s. The 1980s saw a slight retreat, 11 one
that lasted with greater or lesser success through 2008, when the
ongoing economic crisis hit.
Even with the tax debate as excited as ever, it is not realistic to
expect any radical changes to the tax code. Although everyone
seems to agree that the code must be “simplified”–and the
meaning of simplification of course varies considerably–the two
competing purposes will tend to reinforce the present status quo.
Government expenditures are addictive. Just as voters strongly
dislike Congress 12 but tend to like their congressional
representative, 13 so too do most resent a large federal government
but hesitate to make substantive cuts. Specific reductions in
expenditures are met with fierce resistance by those who benefit
from them, whereas the push for tax reform is a very general and
diffuse one. The tax code causes someone to lose and someone to
win, but no one is ever entirely a loser, because there still remain
certain public goods that benefit all taxpayers.
This ratchet makes it easier to increase government spending
than it does to reduce it, meaning that there is also a constant
upward pressure on revenues that have to be raised to cover those
expenses. Because the government does not ordinarily create
wealth, it must rely on two vehicles for funding its operations:
10. Wealth redistribution must to a degree be tied with raising revenue, insofar as
distributing wealth to someone requires taking it from someone else through taxation.
However, because one of the goals of redistribution is not necessarily to raise revenue but
to reduce top incomes, it is not always aligned with efficient revenue-expenditure processes.
This makes it at odds with the pure revenue-raising function of taxation.
11. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
12. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Congress’ Job Approval at New Low of 10%, GALLUP
POLITICS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/152528/congress-job-approval-newlow.aspx (noting that 86% of Americans disapprove of congressional job performance).
13. In a September 2010 poll, for example, Congressman John Dingell, whose district
includes Ann Arbor, MI, was viewed favorably by 48.3% of his constituents. See Ryan J.
Stanton, Latest Poll Shows John Dingell More Popular in Washtenaw County than Other
Parts of District, ANNARBOR.COM (Sep. 20, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/la
test-poll-shows-john-dingell-more-popular-in-washtenaw-county-than-other-parts-of-district/.
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taxation and debt. Taxation is the direct and traditional way to
fund expenditures. The government collects tax and then
redirects it to its targets. Debt is in principle a stopgap for
situations where expenditures exceed revenues. The past several
years have seen skyrocketing government expenditures but
relatively static tax revenues, 14 leading to a higher proportion of
debt. The general sentiment is that running deficits is
undesirable. 15 Barring substantive reductions in expenditures, this
will tend to lead to a stronger push for raising revenues–through
taxation.
WHITHER NOW?
Tax reform is ultimately a political question, and the answer
will not come from within tax law. The law can only provide a tool
for creating and maintaining a system of taxation. The purposes
and priorities are a policy matter. The complexity of the present
system reinforces a longstanding policy of wealth redistribution,
where all constituencies disproportionately benefit from some
aspects, even while many of these constituencies also
disproportionately lose from other aspects. This makes coalition
building to simplify the tax code difficult, as there is a collective
action problem in attempting to seriously do so. Because the
system is much more welcoming of gradualism, it is easier for
specific constituencies to push for specific redistributive policies
and ratchet up the tax code’s complexity. In the end, tax lawyers
can breathe easier, knowing that they will not be out of a job any
time soon.

14. The Heritage Foundation, Federal Spending Is Growing Faster than Federal
Revenue (Chart), 2011 BUDGET CHART BOOK,

http://www.heritage.org/budgetchartbook/growth-federal-spending-revenue (last visited
Mar. 19, 2012).

15. But see, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run Budget Deficits? If
So, Should We Admit It (Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 325, 326 (2006) (“The belief that it is
unquestionably foolish to adopt policies that directly or indirectly increase the
government’s annual borrowing on the financial markets—which is what it means to run a
budget deficit—is not the universal truth that the current conventional wisdom might
imply.”).

